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█ Abstract According to Sandro Nannini’s Time and Consciousness in Cognitive Naturalism, we can draw 
an analogy between the shift in the conception of time that occurred in physics with the introduction of 
relativity theory and a shift towards a scientifically more graspable functional concept of phenomenal 
consciousness. This analogy is meant to persuade us of the eliminative materialist view that we should 
abandon our folk psychological concept of consciousness. In my commentary, I examine the naturaliza-
tion procedure underlying Nannini’s cognitive naturalism, argue for its inability to account for the phe-
nomenal feel of conscious states, and point to some important differences between the conceptual change 
in the case of time and the intended change in the case of consciousness. 
KEYWORDS: Eliminative Materialism; Phenomenal Consciousness; Explanatory Gap; Hard Problem; Cogni-
tive Naturalism. 
 
█ Riassunto Naturalismo cognitivo e sensazioni fenomeniche - In Time and Consciousness in Cognitive Natu-
ralism Sandro Nannini propone un’analogia tra il cambiamento radicale della nozione di tempo che ha 
avuto luogo in fisica con l’introduzione della Teoria della Relatività e un cambiamento radicale del con-
cetto funzionale di coscienza fenomenica, che lo renderebbe più adatto a una descrizione scientifica. 
Questa analogia dovrebbe persuaderci della concezione materialistico-eliminativista, secondo cui dov-
remmo abbandonare la nostra concezione di senso comune della coscienza. Nel mio commento intendo 
esaminare la procedura di naturalizzazione sottostante al naturalismo cognitivo proposta da Nannini, 
cercando di mostrare come questo non sia in grado di rendere conto delle sensazioni fenomeniche che ca-
ratterizzano gli stati coscienti. Intendo inoltre rimarcare alcune importanti differenze tra il mutamento 
concettuale nel caso del tempo e quello ipotizzato in relazione alla coscienza. 
PAROLE CHIAVE: Materialismo eliminativo; Coscienza fenomenica; Iato esplicativo; Hard Problem; Natu-
ralismo cognitivo. 
 
 
 
IN HIS TIME AND CONSCIOUSNESS in 
Cognitive Naturalism, Sandro Nannini tries 
to establish an analogy between the paradigm 
shift that occurred in physics a century ago 
when Einstein introduced his theory of rela-
tivity and the paradigm shift from folk psy-
chology (conceived of as a theory) to cogniti-
ve neuroscience argued for most notably by 
eliminative materialists. According to him, 
there are striking similarities between the 
change in the concept of time (as well as tho-
se of space and gravity) that occurred when 
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moving from classical mechanics to the Spe-
cial Theory of Relativity (STR) and the 
change in the concept of consciousness that 
is needed in order to naturalize mental phe-
nomena. These similarities should make the 
latter conceptual change more plausible. 
Being at least broadly sympathetic to the me-
thod of functional reduction that underlies 
his cognitive naturalism, I find Nannini’s at-
tempt to make a convincing case for the eli-
minative view towards consciousness via this 
analogy intriguing. However, while this line 
of thought seems worth pursuing in princip-
le, I argue that his account ultimately fails 
because it is unable to capture the phenome-
nal aspect of consciousness. 
While many eliminative materialists focus 
on intentional mental states like beliefs and de-
sires, Nannini focuses on phenomenal consci-
ousness, that is, phenomenal experience. Ac-
cording to the traditional view, what charac-
terizes phenomenal experience is a certain qua-
litative feel, a certain what-it-is-like-ness1 – the 
infamous qualia. Because of this, phenomenal 
consciousness is usually thought to be difficult 
or even impossible to account for from a natu-
ralistic point of view. While neuroscience ar-
guably has already made significant progress in 
identifying neural correlates of specific consci-
ous experiences – one of the Easy Problems in 
the terminology of Chalmers2 – the Hard Prob-
lem of explaining how (and why) those neu-
ronal states or processes give rise to phenome-
nal experiences remains. It seems there is an 
unbridgeable (or, as some may say, at least yet 
unbridged) explanatory gap3 between the 
broadly physical and the phenomenal realms.  
In the following, I focus on two aspects of 
Nannini’s account. First, I comment on se-
veral details of his proposed naturalization 
procedure for phenomenal consciousness. I 
then conclude by pointing out some proble-
matic features of his analogy between time 
and consciousness. 
 
█ Phenomenal consciousness naturalized? 
 
As noted above, Nannini tries to overco-
me the explanatory gap by replacing the tra-
ditional concept of phenomenal conscious-
ness with one based in cognitive neuro-
science. After a, in my view, disproportio-
nately long section on the manner in which 
the concept of time is conceptualized in the 
STR as opposed to in classical mechanics, 
which should have been condensed in favor 
of a more detailed explication of his views in 
the later sections, he elaborates on the natu-
ralization procedure by which he proposes to 
develop a scientific account of consciousness.  
His account involves (i) a reconception step 
in which a functional analysis of the pheno-
menon to be naturalized is provided, and (ii) a 
reduction step of the functionalist flavor in 
which the brain processes that implement (or 
realize) that function in a particular entity are 
identified. While I am somewhat sympathetic 
to this approach, I am not sure it can be called 
genuinely eliminativist.  
The eliminativist aspect seems to consist 
in a folk psychological concept being elimi-
nated in favor of a functional concept, but it 
is unclear how this differs from typical func-
tionalist approaches in which mental types 
are characterized solely by their functional 
roles. Eliminativism is often characterized as 
the thesis that there just are no phenomenal 
states at all. This can be interpreted as the 
claim that phenomenal concepts, as usually 
characterized in terms of a certain qualitative 
feel, do not pick out any property at all, and 
thus should be eliminated and replaced with 
functional concepts.  
Thus, Nannini’s proposed naturalization 
procedure, rather than being genuinely eli-
minativist, seems to add merely a further step 
to the functionalist program, which already 
starts out with a functional concept of 
conscious experience. Moreover, it is claimed 
that  
 
[a]ccording to this definition of naturali-
zation procedures, all mental phenomena 
can be reduced to brain processes (and 
more generally to biological and physico-
chemical processes) by combining a func-
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tional reduction with a neuro-biological 
implementation.4 
 
On a literal reading, this would mean that 
the procedure by definition implies that all 
mental phenomena are functionally reducib-
le; however, it seems quite obvious that this 
does not follow. For phenomenal experi-
ences, the first step of the procedure – fin-
ding an “acceptable” functional analysis – ar-
guably fails, as is also shown by Kim,5 from 
whom Nannini adopts the method. 
Rather than addressing the prototypical 
mental phenomena usually targeted by such 
naturalization procedures – particular types 
of phenomenal states such as pains, experi-
ences of redness and so forth – Nannini tries 
to give a naturalistic account of conscious-
ness as a whole. He proposes two functional 
concepts he thinks may potentially serve this 
purpose: Baars’ Global Workspace6 and Edel-
man’s Dynamic Core.7 It is, however, arguable 
that what these concepts actually capture is 
“access consciousness”8 as opposed to “phe-
nomenal consciousness”.9  
According to Block’s distinction, while 
phenomenal consciousness is defined in the 
Nagelian sense mentioned above, access 
consciousness captures the functional-
representational aspect of carrying informati-
on used in reasoning and intentional action. A 
further indication of this confusion is Nanni-
ni’s remark that the first step of his naturaliza-
tion procedure is to find  
 
an acceptable introspective-phenomeno-
logical reconstruction of what is commonly 
meant by words such as “consciousness” or 
“awareness”.10  
 
While he seems to take those two terms as 
being synonymous, the latter is usually 
thought to refer to access consciousness rather 
than phenomenal consciousness.11 Crick and 
Koch hypothesized that the synchronization 
of neural populations may underlie the bin-
ding of information from different modalities. 
Nannini suggests this synchronization pro-
cess as the mechanism implementing the 
format that he identifies phenomenal consci-
ousness with.12 However, unlike Nannini, 
Crick and Koch argue that the problem of 
qualia, the Hard Problem, is «best left on 
one side».13 Nannini argues that  
 
[p]henomenal consciousness is […] the 
common “format” employed by all the 
processes in the brain that make up the 
Complex Scene (or the Dynamic Core). 
And this format must be identified in turn 
with a property shared by their respective 
dynamics.14  
 
However, even if we accept that pheno-
menal consciousness is indeed the format in 
which certain internal states of the brain are 
represented, the problem remains in a diffe-
rent form. On the one hand, if we take the 
format to correspond to the qualitative first-
personal state, it remains unclear both how 
the brain is able to access such a qualitative 
state, and how this fits into the suggested na-
turalization procedure. On the other hand, if 
we take the representational format to be the 
synchronized activity of neural populations, 
as seems to be suggested by Nannini, the ex-
planatory gap (or at least some close cousin) 
is still left wide open – why should such syn-
chronized activity be accompanied by a 
certain phenomenal feel if all that is necessa-
ry for the representation is the synchronized 
activity of a neural population itself? Accord-
ing to Nannini,  
 
phenomenal consciousness must be rede-
fined in functional terms as the higher or-
der property of brain dynamics that trans-
forms a sequence of detached and inde-
pendent brain processes into the conti-
nuous stream of an agent’s subjective ex-
perience.15  
 
This statement is problematic given that 
phenomenal consciousness, as traditionally 
conceived, “is” an agent’s subjective experience. 
Nannini’s talk of “phenomenal conscious-
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ness” “producing” an agent’s subjective expe-
rience as its “output” is at odds with the tra-
ditional conception in a way that does not sit 
well with his overall account. If his goal is to 
eliminate phenomenal consciousness as tra-
ditionally conceived, it remains unclear what 
he means by the “subjective experience” of an 
agent, which he believes to be the result or 
“output” of the transformation process he 
identifies phenomenal consciousness with. 
 
█  Nannini’s analogy between time and con-
sciousness 
 
The paradigm shift in physics from classi-
cal mechanics to STR involved a change in 
the concept of time that is counterintuitive. 
This probably is also the reason why the revi-
sion of the concept within physics did not 
significantly affect our everyday under-
standing of time. Nannini believes that the 
situation is similar in the case of conscious-
ness. He admits that a functional concept of 
consciousness is highly counterintuitive, but 
he also argues that the paradigm shift invol-
ving the reconception of time clearly shows 
that we are able to overcome our intuitive 
views in favor of scientific progress, such that 
we should analogously be able to overcome 
our intuitions in the case of consciousness.  
However, the analogy fails in an im-
portant respect. The concept of time, as cha-
racterized by both classical mechanics and 
STR, obviously does not (and need not) pro-
vide an account of our conscious experience 
of time durations. It can thus be conceptuali-
zed independently of such experience and in 
a manner contrary to our intuitions, which 
are derived from our experience of time un-
der usual circumstances, where the diffe-
rences between the speeds of objects relative 
to the speed of light are negligible. However, 
it is hard to see how an account of phenome-
nal consciousness can be provided without 
accounting for our qualitative first-person 
experience. When trying to account for phe-
nomenal consciousness, what is at stake is 
exactly this qualitative experience, rather 
than something independent of it. Any theo-
ry of phenomenal consciousness thus has to 
provide us with the means to understand 
how it is brought about.  
A similar issue relates to our usual reason 
for adopting a new scientific concept or theo-
ry and leaving a traditional one behind: the 
revised theory must have more explanatory 
power than the old one. Here, there is an im-
portant difference between the two cases in 
Nannini’s analogy.  
On the one hand, by introducing a new 
concept of time, the STR was able to account 
for the observer-relative durations both at the 
“normal” speeds we are commonly confronted 
with and at speeds close to the speed of light. 
The new theory thus boasted more explanato-
ry power than classical mechanics with its mo-
re traditional concept of time. On the other 
hand, a theory that seeks to introduce a func-
tional or neuroscientific concept of consci-
ousness fails in the most important respect 
that would provide it with additional explana-
tory power – it does not explain why pheno-
menally conscious states have a subjective feel. 
This, of course, does not render such a 
concept entirely nonsensical. Rather, it seems 
that such a concept implicitly (or maybe even 
explicitly in some cases) underlies the work 
pursued in the cognitive neurosciences 
anyway – it amounts to what Block calls “ac-
cess consciousness”16 and Chalmers calls the 
“psychological concept of consciousness”.17 
Hence, I do not see what we would gain from 
the proposed conceptual change. The notori-
ously difficult issue of properly relating what 
is picked out by the more traditional concept 
of phenomenal consciousness and by the func-
tional concept is not addressed by the elimina-
tivist view at all, because it supposes that the 
phenomenal concept of consciousness does 
not pick out anything in the first place.  
So, it does not help to call the neuroscienti-
fic concept a phenomenal concept – according 
to this view, it picks out something different, 
or rather something instead of nothing. In the 
end, I believe that Nannini is correct in 
claiming that his account does not solve, but 
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rather dissolve (or as we might rather say: 
neglect) the Hard Problem; but, contrary to his 
view, I have the impression that this approach 
is not beneficial to his theory. 
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